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Abstract 
 
In the theory of riskfree hedges in continuous time finance, one 
can start with the delta-hedge and derive the option pricing 
equation, or one can start with the replicating, self-financing 
hedging strategy and derive both the delta-hedge and the option 
pricing partial differential equation. Approximately reversible 
trading is implicitly assumed in both cases. The option pricing 
equation is not restricted to the standard Black-Scholes equation 
when nontrivial volatility is assumed, but produces option pricing 
in agreement with the empirical distribution for the right choice of 
volatility in a stochastic description of fluctuations. The 
replicating, self-financing hedging strategy provides us with an 
incomplete analogy with thermodynamics where liquidity plays 
the role of the heat bath, the absence of arbitrage is analgous to 
thermal equilibrium, but there is no role played by the entropy of 
the returns distribution, which cannot reach a 
maximum/equilibrium. We emphasize strongly that the no-
arbitrage assumption is not an equilibrium assumption, as is 
taught in economics, but provides only an incomplete, very 
limited analogy with the idea of thermal equilibrium.  
 
We define an approximately reversible trade as one where you can 
reverse your buy or sell order over a very short time interval (on 
the order of a few seconds or ticks) with only very small 
percentage losses, in analogy with approximately reversible 
processes in laboratory experiments in thermodynamics. All that 
follows assumes that approximately reversible trading is possible, 
although reversible trading is the exception in the market. 
 
Consider a dynamic hedging strategy (φ,ψ) defined as follows [1]. 
Suppose you’re short a call at price C(p,t). To cover your bet that 
the underlying stock price will drop, you simultaneously buy φ 
shares of the stock at price p by borrowing ψ dollars from the 
broker (the stock is bought on margin, e.g.). In general, the 
strategy consists of holding φ(p,t) shares of stock at price p, a risky 
asset, and ψ(p,t) shares of a money market fund at initial price 
m=1 Euro/share, a riskless asset (with fixed interest rate r) at all 
times t≤T during the bet, where T is the strike time.  At the initial 
time to the call is worth 
C(po , to ) = φo po +ψ o mo
 
(1) 
where mo=1 Euro. Assuming that (φ,ψ) are twice differentiable 
functions, the portfolio is self-financing if, during dt, 
dφp+ dψm = 0
 
(2) 
so that 
dC = ϕdp +ψdm
 
(3) 
where dm=rmdt. In (3), dC and dp and stochastic variables 
because p(t+dt) and C(t+dt) are unknown and random at time t 
when p(t) and C(p,t) are observed. Viewed as C(p,m) eqn. (3) tells 
us that 
φ = ∂C∂p
 
(4) 
but we will return to this below. Next, we want the portfolio in 
addition to be ‘replicating’, meaning that the twice differentiable 
functional relationship 
 
C(p, t) = φ(p, t)p +ψ( p,t)m
 
(5) 
holds for all later (p,t) up to the strike, and p is the known price at 
time t (for a stock purchase, we can take p to be the ask price). 
Equation (5) expresses the idea that holding the stock plus money 
market in the combination (φ,ψ) is equivalent to holding the call. 
The strategy (φ,ψ), if it can be constructed, defines a ‘synthetic call’: 
the call at price C is synthesized by holding a certain number φ>0 
shares of stock and ψ<0 of money market at each instant t and 
price p(t). These conditions, combined with Ito’s lemma, predict 
the option pricing equation and therefore the price C of the call [1]. 
An analogous argument can be made to construct synthetic puts, 
where covering the bet made by selling the put means shorting φ 
shares of the stock and holding ψ dollars in the money market. In 
this paper we do not criticize the assumption of continuous time 
finance, with ticks on the order of seconds, but leave that for a later 
paper. 
 
Several assumptions are necessary in order for the synthesis to 
work. We state here only the assumptions central for the analogy 
with thermodynamics. One is that transaction costs are negligible. 
Another is that the ‘liquidity bath’ is large enough that borrowing 
the money, selling the call and buying the stock are possible 
approximately instantansously (during a few ticks in the market) 
without affecting the price of either the stock or call, or the interest 
rate r. That is, the desired margin purchase is assumed to be 
possible approximately reversibly in real time through your 
discount broker on your Ibook or PC. This will not be possible if 
the number of shares involved is too large, or if the market crashes 
or balks (because limit bid/ask prices have too large a spread) at 
selling φ shares approximately reversibly (the ‘liquidity bath’ dries 
up in either case).  
 
Starting with the sde for the stock price 
dp = Rpdt +σ (p, t)pdB
 
(6) 
where B(t) defines a Wiener process, with <dB>=0 and <dB2>=dt, 
and using Ito’s lemma [1,3] we obtain the sde 
 
dC = ( Ý C +σ 2 p2 ′ ′ C / 2)dt + ′ C dp
 
(7) 
On the other hand, from (3) and Π=−ψm, we have 
 
dC = φdp − dΠ = φdp − rΠdt = φdp − r(−C + φp)dt
(8) 
As is pointed out in [4], r need not be the riskfree interest rate and, 
in practice, is not but usually is a few percentage points higher. 
Equating coefficients of dp and dt in (7) and (8) we obtain 
 
φ = ∂C∂p
(9) 
which agrees with having treated φ as differentiable above, and the 
option pricing pde 
 
∂C
∂t +
σ 2 ( p, t)p2
2
∂ 2 C
∂p2 = −rp
∂C
∂p + rC
 
(10) 
With (p,t)-dependent volatility σ2(p,t), the pde (10) is not restricted 
to Black-Scholes/Gaussian returns, but includes the exponential 
model of returns [4] as well, although to obtain the exponential 
model we must start with the sde 
dp = (R +σ 2 / 2)dt +σ (p, t)pdB(t)
 
(11) 
The reason for this difference with standard theory is empirics: we 
cannot determine ‘microscopically’ what is the expected return R, 
the coefficient of dt in (6), but must consult instead the empirical 
distribution of returns [4]. The empirical distribution of returns, 
which is exponential, is consistent with a p-independent expected 
return R appearing in the Fokker-Planck equation [4],  
 
∂P(x, t)
∂t = −
∂ (R(t)P(x, t))
∂x +
1
2
∂ 2 (D(x, t)P(x,t))
∂x 2
(12) 
where x=ln(p(t))/p(0)) is the empirically-demanded logarithmic 
return [4], with corresponding stochastic integral equation [3,4] 
 
∆x = R(s)ds + D(x(s), s)
t
t+∆ t∫
t
t+∆t∫ dB(s)
(13) 
 
and where the stochastic integral on the right in (13) is path-
dependent but can be solved by iteration, just as in the theory of 
ordinary differential equations whenever a Lipshitz condition is 
satisfied [3].  
 
Given the pde (10), pricing the call is then as follows: one simply 
solves the option pricing pde but first rewritten via a 
transformation in terms of returns x, as is shown in [4], and one 
then applies the forward-time initial condition C(p,T) =max(p-K) 
at strike time T (K is the strike price), using p=poex. 
 
Equations (3), (4) and (5) define a Legendre transform. We can 
now make an incomplete analogy with thermodynamics, even 
though the market distribution is not in equilibrium, and even 
though our variables are stochastic ones. Eqn. (2) is like a  
generalized Gibbs-Duhem relation and Π=-ψm is analogous to a 
thermodynamic potential. If we ask for a thermodynamic potential 
where extensive variables appear as differentials (we assume that 
(φ,ψ) are analogous to extensive variables in the number of shares 
held) then eqn.  (5) is analogous to a thermodynamic potential 
Φ =ΤSo=E+PV-µN with entropy So held constant (reversible 
adiabatic process), so that dΦ=VdP-Ndµ is analogous to (3). So far, 
this is just empty formalism. The essential part is that the 
assumption of adequate liquidity is analogous to the heat bath, 
and absence of arbitrage possibilities is analogous (but certainly 
not equivalent) to thermal equilibrium, where there are no 
correlations: one can’t get something for nothing out of the heat 
bath because of the second law. In the financial case, arbitrage is 
imposible systematically in the absence of correlations.  
 
If we next consider fluctuations about thermal equilibrium, then 
the analog of a riskfree portfolio (Π=-C+C’p, regarded as a 
portfolio of a call and the underlying stock, is riskfree [2,4]) is the 
vanishing of the mean square fluctuation of the thermodynamic 
potential Φ in the limit of an infinite system far from a phase 
transition (however, this thermal analogy breaks down because 
fluctuations in the corresponding analogues φp and C of 
thermodynamic potentials do not vanish). We neither see nor 
suggest any analogy with phase transitions. The better analogy is 
that large trades violate the heat bath/liquidity assumption, just as 
taking too much energy out of the system’s environment violates 
the assumption that the heat bath remains approximately in 
equilibrium in thermodynamics. 
 
In contrast with the qualitative difference between the 
thermodynamic potential Φ=ΤSo and the call price C, we can write 
down and discuss the (true) Gibb’s entropy S(t) of the empirical 
returns distribution P(x,t). The possibility of arbitrage would 
correspond to a lower entropy (reflecting correlations in the 
empirical returns distribution), as was discussed by Zhang [5]. 
One severe weakness of the above ‚thermodynamic analogy‘ is 
that the entropy S(t) of the returns distribution P(x,t) does not 
appear in (5), and whereas So is constant the real entropy of the 
market, 
S(t) = − P(x, t) ln P(x, t)dx
−∞
∞∫
 
 (14) 
is always increasing because P(x,t) is diffusive. Note that S(t) can 
never reach a maximum due to the time-dependent diffusion 
coefficient D(x,t) and the lack of finite upper and  lower bounds on 
x. Even with a t-independent volatility D(x) and expected stock 
rate of return R, the solution of (12) describing statistical 
equilibrium, 
 
P(x) = C
D(x)
e
2 R (x )
D (x )
dx∫
 
(15) 
 would be possible after a long enough time only if a ‚particle‘ is 
confined, either by a potential U(x,t) or by other constraints,  e.g. 
by a constraint where the ‚particle‘ bounces back and forth 
between two walls pmin≤p≤pmax. This is not what is taught in 
standard economics texts. 
 
Arbitrage possibilities would correspond to correlations (history-
dependence in P(x,t)), whereas the no-arbitrage condition (which 
is essentially the ‚efficient market hypothesis‘, or EMH) is satisfied 
by statistical independence in P(x,t). Our model of volatility of 
empirical returns [4] is based on the assumption of statistical 
independence. The presence of correlations in a returns 
distribution would imply a lower entropy than in the case of no 
correlations, but entropy has been ignored in the economics 
literature where the emphasis has been (mis-)placed on the 
extreme (and empirically incorrect) notions of perfect foresight, 
instant information transfer [6] and utility maximization [7], 
instead of loss of information. 
 
We cannot stress too much that the ‘no-arbitrage’ condition is not, 
as is claimed in papers and books on economics and finance [2], an 
equilibrium condition, dynamically seen. In Fama’s famous paper 
on the EMH [6] he assumes that Martingale expectation values of 
random variables represent ‘market equilibrium’ even though 
those expectation values are time-dependent, and even though the 
market is generally far from dynamic equilibrium: total excess 
demand never vanishes due to outstanding limit orders. That limit 
orders cannot be filled is equivalent to saying that agents are 
dissatisfied with bid/ask prices that are offered, and so prices 
fluctuate approximately statistically-independently, never 
reaching any equilibrium. Again, no-arbitrage in very liquid 
markets is not an equilibrium condition but provides at best only a 
very weak and incomplete analogy with thermal equilibrium, where 
in the latter nothing changes with time. 
 
The assumption of ‚no market impact‘ (meaning enough liquidity) 
during trading is an approximation that is limited to very small 
trades in a heavily-traded market (and is violated when, e.g., 
Deutsche Bank takes a very large position in Mexican Pesos or 
Czec Crowns; see Dacorogna et al [8] for a discussion of the effects 
of large limit orders). In thermodynamics, the reservoir’s 
temperature can be treated as unaffected by energy exchanges 
with the system only to 0th order, where the first order entropy 
change is zero (δS=0 defines a reversible process). However, the 
total entropy change of system plus reservoir is given by [9] 
 
(16) 
∆S = δS + δ 2 S + ... + δ nS + ...
where the second order change is positive, δ2S>0, guaranteeing 
stability of thermal equilibrium (stability fails at a phase transition, 
e.g.), because the temperature difference between the reservoir and 
the system is finite, otherwise no energy exchange, no matter how 
small, can occur approximately reversibly.  
 
No comparable description or correction to first order effects exists 
in option pricing. However, reversible trading is consistent with 
the observed empirical fat-tailed distribution (and therefore with 
large fluctuations) for a choice of volatility σ2(p,t) that permits 
description of the empirical distribution by a Fokker-Planck 
equation. We have shown in [4], for the empirical distribution 
P(x,t) for interday trading of bonds and foreign exchange, written 
in terms of returns x=ln(p(t)/p(0)), that the volatility is given by 
σ2(p,t) = D(x,t)=bν(x-δ) where b is constant but ν and δ are time-
dependent. 
 
The idea of synthetic options, based on equation (5), led to so-
called ‘portfolio insurance’, which was based implicitly on the 
assumption of approximately reversible trading, that agents would 
always be there to take the other side of a desired trade at 
approximately the price wanted. In October, 1987, the market 
crashed, meaning that liquidity dried up, and many people who 
had believed (without really thinking about the implicit 
assumption of liquidity [10]) that they were ‚insured‘ lost money. 
The idea of portfolio insurance was based on an excessive belief in 
the mathematics of approximately reversible trading combined 
with the expectation that the market will go up, on the average 
(R>0), but ignoring the (unknown) time scales over which 
downturns and recoveries occur, if ever. The strategy of a self-
financing, replicating hedge requires an agent to buy on the way 
up and sell on the way down. This strategy led to buying high and 
selling low, which is not usually a prescription for success.  
 
Another example of misplaced trust in neo-classical economic 
beliefs is the case of LTCM, where it was assumed that prices 
would always return to historic averages, in spite of the lack of 
‚springs‘ in the market (there is no restoring force in (6), no 
evidence for a stabilizing ‚invisible hand‘), and correspondingly 
throwing good money after bad until the Gamblers‘ Ruin [11] 
ended the game. One does not know yet the real story of which 
assumptions led to the recent disaster of Enron, other than (as with 
LTCM) the belief that unregulated free markets are stable, but 
apparently they are not. The entropy (14) is always increasing, 
never reaching a maximum, and is consistent with very large 
fluctuations that have unknown and completely unpredictable 
relaxation times. The neo-classical economists have it all wrong: 
one cannot have both deregulation and stable equilibrium. One 
might at best have either stability or total lack of regulations (the 
individual moral contraint in agents that Adam Smith [12] 
presummed necessary for stabilizing the so-called ‚invisible hand‘ 
is completely lacking in modern global capitalism, if ever it was 
present). Based on the observed instability of unregulated free 
markets as reflected by liquid market statistics, we predict that 
more deregulation will lead to more financial disasters. 
Globalization since the downfall of the USSR is a completely 
uncontrolled global experiment whose outcome cannot be 
correctly predicted on the basis of either past history (statistics) or 
neo-classical economic theory, but with LTCM, Enron and 
Argentina as examples of some of the recent consequences of 
deregulation one should not be optimistic. 
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